Explain the Decision in Marbury V Madison and How It Created Judicial Review

On February 24, 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall issued the Supreme Court'southward conclusion in Marbury 5. Madison, establishing the constitutional and philosophical principles behind the loftier court's power of judicial review.

The dramatic tale begins with the presidential election of 1800, in which President John Adams, a Federalist, lost reelection to Thomas Jefferson, a Autonomous-Republican. Congress also changed hands, with the Democratic-Republicans achieving majorities in both chambers.

Adams and the Federalists could see the writing on the wall: the party'south power had been limited to the judicial branch. In a bid to strengthen Federalist ability, President Adams appointed Secretary of State John Marshall to be Main Justice of the U.s.a.. The Federalists, with weeks remaining in the lame-duck session, passed a new Judiciary Act—the "Circuit Courtroom Act"—which expanded the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and created half-dozen new circuits with xvi new judicial seats. (The police besides eliminated circuit duty for Supreme Court justices, and provided for easier removal of litigation from state to federal court.)

To fill the newly expanded judiciary, on March ane, 1801, three days before Jefferson's inauguration, Adams stayed up belatedly into the nighttime signing commissions for the new judges, including the 42 new Justices of the Peace. The "midnight appointments," as they came to be known, were also notarized by Marshall, nonetheless performing his secretarial duties. Merely the rush of presidential transition led to the administration's failure to deliver several of those commissions, including that owed to William Marbury, who had been named a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia. On March 4, upon assuming the office of the presidency, Jefferson ordered Secretary of State James Madison not to deliver the commissions.

Marbury's lost committee became a test instance for the ousted Federalists who were outraged over the Democratic-Republican Congress'southward repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the passing of a replacement act in 1802, and who were hoping to test its constitutionality equally soon as possible. Before the Supreme Court considered the example in Feb, Congress held a viciously partisan debate over the constitutionality of the Repeal Act, with Republicans claiming that the people were the final judges of the constitutionality of acts of Congress. Marbury, with representation from Adams' Chaser General Charles Lee, demanded a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to obtain his committee.

In Yard arbury v. Madison, the Courtroom was asked to respond iii questions. Did Marbury have a right to his commission? If he had such a right, and the right was violated, did the law provide a remedy? And if the police force provided a remedy, was the proper remedy a direct society from the Supreme Court?

Writing for the Courtroom in 1803, Marshall answered the offset two questions resoundingly in the affirmative. Marbury's commission had been signed by the President and sealed past the Secretary of State, he noted, establishing an appointment that could not be revoked past a new executive. Failure to deliver the commission thus violated Marbury's legal correct to the function.

Marshall also ruled that Marbury was indeed entitled to a legal remedy for his injury. Citing the great William Blackstone's Commentaries, the Chief Justice declared "a general and indisputable rule" that, where a legal right is established, a legal remedy exists for a violation of that right.

 It was in the third office of the opinion that presented a dilemma: If Marshall decided to grant the remedy and social club commitment of the commissions, he risked just being ignored by his rivals, thereby exposing the young Supreme Courtroom as powerless to enforce its decisions, and damaging its time to come legitimacy. But siding with Madison would have been seen as caving to political force per unit area—an equally damaging outcome, particularly to Marshall who valued the Courtroom as a nonpartisan institution. The ultimate resolution is seen by many scholars as a fine balancing of these interests: Marshall ruled that the Supreme Court could non order commitment of the commissions, because the police force establishing such a power was unconstitutional itself.

That law, Department xiii of the Judiciary Act of 1789, said the Court had "original jurisdiction" in a case like Marbury—in other words, Marbury was able to bring his lawsuit directly to the Supreme Court instead of first going through lower courts. Citing Commodity III, Section 2 of the Constitution, Marshall pointed out that the Supreme Courtroom was given original jurisdiction just in cases "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" or in cases "in which a State shall exist Party." Had the Founders intended to empower Congress to assign original jurisdiction, Marshall reasoned, they would non have enumerated those types of cases. Congress, therefore, was exerting ability it did not take.

This was an do of judicial review, the power to review the constitutionality of legislation. To exist sure, Marshall did not invent judicial review—several state courts had already exercised judicial review, and delegates to the Ramble Convention and ratifying debates spoke explicitly about such power being given to the federal courts. The Courtroom itself in the 1796 example of Hylton v. Usa reviewed and upheld an act of Congress every bit constitutional—with Alexander Hamilton arguing for the validity of the taxation in question. And in Ware v. Hylton, the Supreme Court struck downwardly a Virginia creditor constabulary in disharmonize with the Treaty of Paris based on federal supremacy.

Still, the legendary Master Justice practical judicial review firmly and artfully to the nation's highest court. "Information technology is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Section," he wrote, "to say what the police force is." Until Marbury, judicial review was not widely accepted in cases of doubtful unconstitutionality and was non an aspect of ordinary judicial action, and its telescopic was more minor. And while Marbury was non a particularly controversial decision in 1803, information technology has remained the source of scholarly debate.

In the curt run, Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans got what they wanted: Marbury and the other "midnight appointments" were denied commissions. But in the long run, Marshall got what he wanted: A independent Supreme Court with the ability of judicial review. As historian Gordon Wood eloquently put information technology, Marshall's greatest achievement was not invented judicial review, but "maintaining the Court's being and asserting its independence in a hostile Republican climate."

For more reading on the debate between scholars over the meaning of Marbury and its implication for judicial review and judicial supremacy, consider the post-obit:

Bruce Ackerman, Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy (Harvard University Press 2005)

Albert Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (1919)

Edward S. Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution: A Chronicle of the Supreme Courtroom (1977)

Mark A. Graber, "Passive-Ambitious Virtues: Cohens five. Virginia and the Problematic Institution of Judicial Power," 12 Const. Comm. 68, https://salvation.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/167160/12_01_Graber.pdf?sequence=ane&isAllowed=y

Charles Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Dominion of Law (1996)

Michael J. Klarman, "How Great Were the 'Great' Marshall Courtroom Decisions?" Va. L. Rev. (2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270081

Larry Kramer, "Marbury and the Retreat from Judicial Supremacy," 20 Const. Comm. 205 (2003), https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/183156/20_02_Kramer.pdf

Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers Constitution (2000)

Jed Handelsman Shugerman, "Marbury and Judicial Deference: The Shadow of Whittington v. Polk and Maryland Judiciary Battle," v U. Pa. J. Const. L. 58 (2002), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jcl/vol5/iss1/3/

William W. Van Alstyne, "A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 18 Duke L. J. 1-47 (1969), https://scholarship.law.knuckles.edu/faculty_scholarship/544/

Louise Weinberg, "Marbury v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium," 89 Va. L. Rev. 1235 (2003), https://law.utexas.edu/kinesthesia/uploads/publication_files/ourmarburypub.pdf

Nicholas Mosvick is a Senior Fellow for Constitutional Content at the National Constitution Center.

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Source: https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/blog/marbury-v-madison-and-the-independent-supreme-court